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Important aspect of ongoing discussions on the choice of exchange rate regime is 
its reaction to crisis as a strong and unexpected external shock; such was the case 
of Great Recession from 2008.-onwards. It is generally accepted that pegged 
exchange rate regimes are more sensitive to external shocks that might cause their 
long-term destabilization. Still, the soft pegged regimes (also entitled intermediate 
regimes) have fewer limits, with rules that allow more maneuver space for national 
strategy. The group of soft pegged regimes is wider, both in structure and scope, 
then those of hard pegged regimes. While countries with more flexible regimes 
might use exchange rate fluctuations as automatic stabilisator, (hard and/or soft) 
pegs impose some limitations. In the first place, there is stability goal that, in 
combination with strict regulatory rules, limits the monetary and exchange rate 
policy, demanding the use of other strategies, such is the internal devaluation. 
Secondly, these countries do not use wide scope of instruments and their crisis 
strategy is more rigid than those of other regimes. Finally, there are dilemmas on 
the optimality of exchange rate strategy during the pre-eurozone membership 
period, including the euro introduction strategy. These dilemmas deepen in terms 
of crisis.   
 
This paper focuses on comparison of hard and soft pegged regimes (the latter also 
entitled intermediate regimes) in selected European union accession countries, 
using „de facto“classification scale developed by International Monetary Fund. 
Despite the crisis, there have not been dramatic turbulences in terms of exchange 
rate policy in observed countries, but the general economic indicators clearly show 
the real depth of crisis and slow recovery. The question open for further discussion 
is whether such regimes should be obtained or abandoned during the crisis and 
what is their contribution to national economy. Furthermore, there are pros and 
cons of possible strategies, considering the European integration process.  
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For the post-transition and post-centrally planned economies, european integration 
is a process that includes a well-defined strategy and efforts in all aspects of 
national economy, including the exchange rate policy. On the other hand, the 
process is not isolated from endogenous and exogenous shocks, such was the 
global crisis that endangered stability of the global markets from 2008 onwards 
(also entitled Global Recession). The focus of this paper is on the hard and soft 
exchange rate pegs in chosen European countries, considering the importance of 
exchange rate policy in national economy.    
 
Analyses of determinants of exchange rate regime success include its 
characteristics, influence on other economic variables and external factors. The 
period of Global Recession has been turbulent for post-transition countries such 
was for the rest of the world, including dilemmas on optimality of their exchange 
rate policies and European integration process dynamics (measured in terms of 
Maastricht criteria, additional criteria introduced by European Commission and 
national strategies). The sample observed in this paper covers post-transition 
countries with hard and soft pegs, as classified by IMF (IMF, 2017, pp 6-8), 
varying from official euroisation (“exchange arrangement with no separate legal 
tender” (IMF, 2017)) and currency board arrangement as hard pegs to some form 
of intermediate regime (“soft pegs” (IMF, 2017))with certain level of sovereign 
and active monetary policy. Since inflation stability (measured in terms of price 
levels) has been the main monetary policy goal during the observed period, 
analyses provided in this paper also take it into consideration. Although a 
heterogeneous group, observed countries participate in European integration 
process, but are in different phases of accomplishing a full membership in 
european Economic and monetary union. The sample consists of countries with 
pegged regimes; namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential 
candidates, while Serbia, Montenegro and FYR of Macedonia are candidate 
countries. Three countries from the sample (Bulgaria, Croatia and Czech Republic) 
are full members of European Union, with an “opt-in” clause for Eurozone 
membership. Still, they are not participating in Exchange Rate Mechanism II. 
Denmark (although maintaining a conventional peg, which is a form of soft peg) 
was not considered as a part of this sample since it participates in Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II.  
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During the global crisis, important questions were whether the national currency is 
over- or undervalued, does the chosen national exchange rate regime remains a 
good choice in terms of crisis, and whether is able to provide sustainable 
instruments for crisis strategy. Exchange rate fluctuations, allowed within floating 
regimes and partially within the intermediates, are usually considered automatic 
stabilizers, while the pegged regimes are more focused on retaining the stability of 
exchange rate and price level, with less maneuver space. Question on whether to 
change the pegged regime or not, and what exit strategy should be used, remains 
open. For the countries in the sample exit strategy is full membership in European 
monetary union1. Still, considering the criteria of nominal and real convergence, 
exchange rate policy might contribute to the effectiveness of the process.  
 
This paper, considering the reaction of chosen post-transition countries on Great 
Recession pressures, focuses on few questions, contributing to the wide literature 
on exchange rate regimes with an analyze on pegged regimes, considering both 
hard and soft pegs, the latter also entitled intermediate regimes. Besides the 
theoretical analyses, main economic indicators are observed, in order to analyze 
whether the stability and predefined goals (primary price stability) was endangered 
by strong external shock, such was the global crisis. For that purpose the paper first 
analyzes shares of the two observed groups within total IMF members, their 
characteristics and changes both in classification schemes and the strategies 
(regimes) used by countries. 
 
Traditionally, earlier literature on exchange rate regimes, especially in late 1990s 
and early 2000s,is focused on choice between so called corner solutions (fixed vs. 
flexible regimes) but there is also a group of regimes that are intermediate2, 
combining the characteristics of the two extremes (see more discussions on 
exchange rate regimes and its characteristics in, for example, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), Frankel (1999),Edwards (2001), Rogoff, et. al. (2003), Eichengreen, 
(2008)).Considering the IMF’s classification scheme and database, these regimes 
(there entitled soft pegs), have the highest share in total regimes and are the most 
heterogeneous group, while hard pegs have the lowest, rather stable share. The 
sample in this paper consists of countries with hard and soft pegs, according to the 
IMF’s de facto classification scheme, despite the (de jure) publicly announced 
regime. Although transition countries used different types of regimes, inflation 
stabilization and control of price level was the final goal for their policies. 
Furthermore, national authorities’ efforts were oriented towards establishing the 
institutional framework and enhancing the monetary stability.  
 
                                                     
1Note that some countriesfromthesamplealready are members of European Union (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, CzechRepublic).   
2In literature alsoentitledas „soft pegs“, according to InternationalMonetaryFund 
„AnnualReport on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions“, Washington D. C., 
differentyears 
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The regimes are considered as of pre-crisis 2004 and post-crisis 2017, including the 
monetary policy framework. Although both regime groups observed are based on 
pegs, these intermediate (soft pegged) regimes allow some level of (controlled) 
fluctuation around the peg whether the target range is publicly announced or not. 
Although exit strategy for the countries from the sample is eurozone membership, 
at this moment they still have (a certain level of) monetary sovereignty.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, there is a second chapter 
that covers theoretical background and brief literature overview. The influence of 
crisis is described in third chapter, which is followed by conclusion (fourth).  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW 
 
Choice of national exchange rate regime and consequences on national economy is 
a widely discussed topic in monetary policy and international finance. Besides the 
scope of a particular discussion, it is generally accepted that exchange rate policy 
influence national economy on many different levels. Since the focus of the paper 
is on pegged regimes, there should be a distinction between characteristics and 
scope of hard and soft pegged regimes, although the classification includes also 
floating, market-determined regimes (floating and free floating) and residual (other 
managed arrangements). (IMF, 2017, pp. 1).  
 
Precisely, hard pegs consist of currency board arrangement and regimes with no 
separate legal tender (official dollarization/euroisation). Soft pegs (in literature also 
entitled as intermediate regimes) are a wide group consisting of heterogeneous 
regimes as following: conventional pegged arrangement, stabilized arrangement, 
crawling peg, crawl-like arrangement and pegged exchange rate within horizontal 
bands. (IMF, 2017, pp. 1) 
 
2.1. Some remarks on exchange rate policy debate issues – theoretical 
background 
 
One of the important questions in discussion on exchange rate regime choice is the 
accuracy of the classification methodology that, among other, resulted in de facto 
classification system developed by IMF. Besides this classification scheme, a 
number of authors contributed to discussion developing the criteria and 
classification systems. That resulted in different models, while mostly used are 
those developed by Bubulaand Ötker-Robe (2002), Reinhart and  Rogoff (2004) 
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005, 2016). Some authors (Eichengreenand 
Razo-Garcia, 2011), Bleaney, Tian and Yin (2017))also contributed to the 
discussion on the optimality of exchange rate regime choice comparing different 
classification schemes and criterions used. An analysis of dilemmas in post-
trasition monetary and exchange rate policies is provided in Kordić (2015), 
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considering influence of global crisis on selected indicators between eurozone 
member countries and those that are still outside the eurozone.   
 
There have been different opinions and recommendations for exchange rate regime 
optimality, including those when intermediate regimes were observed as more 
sensitive to speculative attacks and crisis, and others focused on its impact on 
economic growth(a wider discussion is given in Frankel (2003)). Relation between 
manipulating with national currency and economic growth is a theoretical 
presumption, but also a cornerstone for national strategies. In his seminal paper, 
Rodrik (2008) has proven that undervaluation of the currency (in terms of (higher) 
real exchange rate) has a positive impact on economic growth. Explanation 
provided in the paper is twofold, including the institutional weaknesses and 
product-market failures. Sosvilla-Riveroand Ramos-Herrera (2014), following 
aforementioned Rodrik’s (2008) paper, contribute to discussion on relation 
between exchange rate regime and economic growth. Dataset consisted of 123 
(developing and developed) countries during 1970-2010. Based on the empirical 
research authors concluded that the best performance was in countries with 
intermediate regimes, while those with flexible regimes had the smallest growth 
rates. Further, authors divided economies based on income, according to the World 
Bank classification. Following this criteria, they confirmed conclusion of growth 
rates in countries with intermediate regimes. There are also differences in 
economic growth rate within different income level groups (considering the chosen 
regime), which does not hold for high-income countries.  
 
It is generally considered that hard pegged regimes are better in providing more 
disciplined policy, while in later stages they might be widened, allowing exchange 
rate to fluctuate. Exchange rate policy determines the potential level of adjustment 
to internal and external shocks and, consequently, the susceptibility of crisis. Chiu, 
et. al. (2012) analyze the distinction between hard and soft pegs in providing 
discipline in monetary and fiscal policy. Their work also contributed to the 
literature by fulfilling the gap in theory, since the focus is usually on fixed and 
floating regimes influence on economic indicators, with less attention on relation 
between hard and soft pegs. Using dataset consisted of 31 emerging markets and 32 
developing countries during 1990-2003 they confirmed that hard pegs have 
stronger discipline impact on stabilizing money growth and inflation. On the other 
hand, influence of exchange rate regime on fiscal discipline was not confirmed. 
Combes, Mineaand Sow (2016) used a panel of 90 developed and developing 
countries during 1980-2009 in order to analyze the relation between crisis and 
exchange rate regime used. They have taken into consideration different types of 
crisis: banking, currency and debt, testing the “bipolar view” hypothesis. In order 
to prevent the crisis, countries should focus more on macroeconomic policies, and 
less on exchange rate regime choice. Such policies that are oriented towards 
prevention of crisis should include limits on credit growth, avoiding debt 
monetization with sound fiscal policies and controlling the public debt. 
254
2.2. Practical use of (hard and soft) pegged regimes in practice of 
International Monetary Fund member countries  
 
The theoretical background for this analysis, besides the data presenting their share 
within IMF member countries, also includes the discussion on different (de facto) 
classification systems and influence of crisis on a particular regime. Although there 
have been developed numerous classification schemes (especially during late 
1990sand early 2000s, as explained in the previous chapter), those developed and 
maintained by the IMF is used in this paper.  
 
As stated before, soft pegged regimes have larger share than hard pegs but that 
might be explained also with the wider scope of the group. The data on share of 
hard and soft pegged regimes (the latter also entitled intermediate) in IMF 
classification scheme are presented in Figure 1 for the 2008-2016.  
 
Figure 1. Hard and soft pegged exchange rate regimes, IMF classification scheme, 
2008-2016 
percent of IMF members as of April 3
Source: International Monetary Fund, „Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions“, Washington, D. C., 2016, pp 8. 
 
Besides the high share in total regimes, soft pegs had rather strong oscillations (in 
total and within an individual subgroup) during the period observed. As mentioned 
in previous discussion, this category is heterogeneous and wide, as can be observed 
from the data presented in Figure 2. 
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Within this group, conventional pegs prevailed during the observed period (with 
share of more than 22%), followed by stabilized arrangement, whose share varied 
significantly. Shares of crawling pegs and pegged exchange rate regimes within 
horizontal bands have been rather stable, while share of crawl-like arrangements 




Figure 2. Soft pegged regimes by category, IMF classification scheme, 2008-2016 
percent of IMF members as of April 30 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund „Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions“, Washington, D. C., 2016, pp. 8. 
 
 
Group of hard peggers consists of only two regimes: currency board arrangement 
and no separate legal tender, so their share in total regimes is smaller. (IMF, 2016). 
 
Figure 3. Hard pegged regimes by category, IMF classification scheme, 2008-2016 
percent of IMF members as of April 30 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund „Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions“, Washington, D. C., 2016, pp. 8. 
 
Practical use of intermediate regimes has widened after early 1970s and 
abandoning fixed regimes based on dollar/gold parity, including the debate on the 
optimality of exchange rate regime choice and developed de facto policy 
classification. Still, this debate is ongoing process with limited unique answers.  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Conventional peg 22.3 22.3 23.3 22.6 22.6 23.6 23 23 22.9
Stabilized arrangement 12.8 6.9 12.7 12.1 8.4 9.9 11 11.5 9.4
Crawling peg 2.7 2.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1 1 1.6 1.6
Crawl-like arrangement 1.1 0.5 1.1 6.3 6.3 7.9 7.9 10.5 5.2
Pegged exchange rate regime













2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
5.3 5.3 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 7.3
6.9 6.9 6.9 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.7
No separate legal tender Currency board
Gordana Kordić 
3. INFLUENCE OF CRISIS ON PEGGED REGIMES – WAS THERE A 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HARD AND SOFT PEGS 
 
Analyses in this paper are focused on influence of external shock (global financial 
crisis) on hard and soft pegged regimes in European post-transition countries. It is 
common opinion that the fixed regimes (hard pegs) are more prone to external 
shock, since they lack the appropriate defending mechanism. On the other side, 
being allowed to fluctuate, intermediate regimes (soft pegs) are able to use more 
active policy that should protect them from this type of shocks.  
 
Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks in 2004 and 20173 
according to the IMF current classification scheme are presented in Table 1. In 
making a decision on exchange rate policy, transition countries had some 
conflicting objectives (Szapáry, 2001) such were maintaining exchange rate 
stability in terms of volatile capital flows, controlling exchange rate appreciation 
respecting Balassa-Samuelson effect and achieving Maastricht criteria (especially 
in terms of inflation).  
 
Countries observed in this paper are post-transition countries with hard and soft 
pegs: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Kosovo, FYR 
of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro during the time scale 2004-2017. The de 
facto regimes and monetary policy anchors as in 2004 and 20174 for countries in 
the sample are presented in Table 1, considering that the IMF classification scheme 
changed during the period observed (in 2009). Consequently, the classification of 
regimes varied, while for the purpose of this paper the status in 2017 has been used 
as a criterion. The heterogeneity of the sample (while the countries are classified in 
the same group) reminds that there is no unique solution, but the individual 
approach is required. 
 
Table 1. De facto exchange rate regimes for selected European countries, IMF 




































                                                     
3Note thatIMF'sclassification scheme, originatedin 1999. was redefined in 2009 that 
resulted indifferences in categorisation.  
4Thelatestyearavailablein IMF statistics. 
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Notes: *in the RepublikaSrpska, the Serbian dinar circulates; **in 2004.the country 
was Serbia and Montenegro, while Kosovo was UN-administered province.  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund „Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions 2017“, Washington, D. C., 2017., pp. 6-8, (accessed 
October 17 2018.)and International Monetary Fund, “Classification of Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks”, available at 




Comparing the two years (2004 and 2017) there is a change in regimes from 
“managed floating with no-predetermined path for the exchange rate” to hard 
pegged regimes in two cases –first, Kosovo and Montenegro switched to “no 
separate legal tender”, using euro as exchange rate anchor and being officially 
euroised. This was followed by political changes, since in 2004 Montenegro was 
not an independent country, while Kosovo was UN-administered province. In the 
second case (Croatia and Czech Republic) these regimes switched to stabilized 
arrangement. Currency board arrangements, based on euro as exchange rate 
anchor, remained unchanged (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria), while Serbia 
switched to inflation targeting regime, with “stabilized arrangement” as a de facto 
exchange rate regime. Still, within the soft peggers, there is also a different level of 
exchange rate activities and monetary policy that includes both exchange rate 
anchors to euro (but still outside the ERM II) and formal inflation targeting (noting 
that there is a de facto exchange rate peg, even within inflation targeting as 
monetary policy framework).  
 
Influence of crisis might be detected in fluctuation and derogation of main 
economic indicators, since the crisis was a strong external shock for national 
economies. One possible solution, usually recommended in crisis, is to devaluate 
national currency, in order to stimulate national economy. But, in terms of hard peg 
such external devaluation is not an option considering the rules of arrangement. 
Alternative stabilizing mechanism is to use internal devaluation, that should protect 
the regime but on the high cost for national economy. 
 
General data for countries observed are presented in Figures 4 and 5, covering 
inflation rate and GDP growth (both annual percentage change, using GDP deflator 
for inflation).  
 
Inflation rates (Figure 4), especially considering the fact that price stability is the 
main goal for the monetary policy in observed countries has been rather unstable 
and, in some periods, higher than projected. However, despite the crisis, hard pegs 




Figure 4. Inflation, GDP deflator, (annual, %) for selected countries, 2004-2015 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&id=1ff4
a498&report_name=Popular-Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y# 
(accessed 24 April 2018) 
 
Volatility of inflation included the phases of rather high rates and those with 
indicators of deflation. Following the deflationary trends, the rates decreased after 
2012, reaching even negative values, followed by a slight recovery.   
 
As can be observed from Figure 5, GDP annual change (%) was negative during 











2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2015.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.57 2.83 7.83 6.29 7.21 0.17 1.40 2.44 0.80 -0.23 1.00 1.37
Bulgaria 5.63 6.50 6.74 11.07 9.74 4.05 1.11 5.98 1.56 -0.70 0.45 2.21
Croatia 3.72 3.40 4.00 4.11 5.70 2.78 0.83 1.67 1.58 0.80 0.05 0.01
Czech Republic 3.87 0.07 0.69 3.52 2.05 2.60 -1.43 0.02 1.46 1.43 2.48 1.17
Kosovo -3.84 -3.21 3.53 1.26 7.12 1.42 4.69 3.88 2.45 2.20 3.26 0.22
Macedonia, FYR -0.17 4.90 3.25 4.59 5.49 0.30 2.04 3.72 1.00 4.48 1.45 1.89
Montenegro 5.92 4.32 9.06 12.72 11.87 2.41 1.60 1.20 0.18 2.07 1.04 2.22







Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia
Czech Republic Kosovo Macedonia, FYR
Montenegro Serbia
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Figure 5. GDP growth (annual, %) for selected countries, 2004-2015 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&i
d=1ff4a498&report_name=Popular-
Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y#(accessed 24 April 2018) 
 
Although there is a slight recovery after the 2009, sample countries still did not 
reach the pre-crisis levels. According to this criterion, both observed groups 
followed the same trends. Still, in their study Belhocine, et. al. (2016, pp 14.) 
describe the different growth patterns between countries depending on the 
exchange rate regime choice. European countries with harder regimes (lower 
flexibility) recorded a boom until 2007/08crisis, followed by a recession, while the 
recovery in 2011-2013 was somewhat stronger than in those with more flexible 
regimes. But, after the mid-2013, the latter group of countries had faster growth 
than the other. Furthermore, their research confirmed higher growth volatility for 
countries with low exchange rate volatility (especially the Baltics).  
 
Hereafter, it is interesting to observe the dynamics of exports (Figure 6) and 






























Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.10 8.76 5.38 5.73 5.58 -2.99 0.87 0.96 -0.82 2.35 1.15 3.07
Bulgaria 6.56 7.24 6.75 7.68 3.64 -3.59 1.32 1.92 0.03 0.86 1.33 3.62
Croatia 4.08 4.16 4.79 5.15 2.05 -7.38 -1.70 -0.28 -2.19 -1.06 -0.49 2.25
Czech Republic 4.91 6.53 6.85 5.60 2.68 -4.80 2.27 1.78 -0.80 -0.48 2.72 5.31
Kosovo 2.61 6.03 4.50 7.29 2.64 3.34 3.31 4.62 2.81 3.44 1.22 4.08
Macedonia, FYR 4.67 4.72 5.14 6.47 5.47 -0.36 3.36 2.34 -0.46 2.93 3.63 3.84
Montenegro 4.40 4.19 8.57 10.66 3.49 -5.80 2.73 3.23 -2.72 3.55 1.78 3.39








Figure 6. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2004-2015 
 
Notes: the data for Kosovo are not available for 2004 and 2005  
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&id=1ff4
a498&report_name=Popular-Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y# 
(accessed 24 April 2018) 
 
Both the data for exports and imports are following the trends observed in GDP 
growth, confirming the strong influence of crisis and slight recovery after 2010. 
Still, despite the fact that observed countries belong to (hard or soft) pegged 
regimes, structural differences and general level of economic development are 
visible following the results in this category, and need to be taken into 



























Kosovo 0.00 0.00 12.62 15.48 15.66 17.06 19.85 23.77 23.35 21.90 22.50 21.94
Montenegro 42.02 43.55 49.37 44.39 39.52 34.33 37.04 42.35 43.67 41.34 40.14 42.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32.24 31.62 35.02 27.11 26.85 25.01 29.70 32.04 32.35 33.74 33.99 34.58
Bulgaria 41.06 42.60 47.08 51.97 52.54 42.33 50.18 59.07 60.80 64.65 65.01 64.11
Croatia 39.45 39.30 39.66 39.00 38.48 34.52 37.74 40.41 41.57 43.03 46.43 48.72
Macedonia, FYR 30.70 34.81 37.79 44.12 43.22 32.81 39.79 47.12 45.37 43.40 47.66 48.80
Czech Republic 57.34 62.18 65.19 66.41 63.23 58.68 66.03 71.31 76.17 76.87 82.55 81.05








Figure 7. Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2004.-2015. 
 
Notes: the data for Kosovo are not available for 2004 and 2005  
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&id=1ff4
a498&report_name=Popular-Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y# 
(accessed 24 April 2018) 
 
Since the pegged exchange rates were not abandoned and considering the fact that 
these regimes have less opportunities for adjustment, there is a stronger pressure on 
wages and employment. This is usually considered to be a part of internal 
devaluation strategy, opposite from adjustment using exchange rate policy 
(external devaluation). This is also a way to retain the peg (considering possible 
exchange rate fluctuations within the intermediate regimes) but on the cost in other 
areas.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The main goal of the paper is to analyze the functioning of hard and soft pegged 
exchange rate regimes (the latter also entitled intermediate), on a sample of post-
transition countries. The sample covers the two groups of pegged regimes, hard and 
soft (intermediate) pegs. It has been formed using the IMF’s exchange rate regimes 
classification scheme and dataset (IMF, 2017). Share of hard pegged regimes in 
total is lower than those of soft pegs, considering also that the scope of soft pegs is 
wider, consisting of a broader, more heterogeneous group of regimes. Two out of 
eight countries in the sample are officially euroised, other two have a currency 

























Kosovo 0.00 0.00 47.82 50.66 54.25 51.93 55.41 58.29 54.12 49.60 51.22 51.16
Montenegro 58.09 61.08 79.10 86.70 92.82 65.09 62.74 64.31 68.09 61.43 59.98 60.57
Bosnia and Herzegovina 77.50 71.62 63.01 56.46 59.31 48.74 51.27 55.80 55.85 54.13 56.57 53.23
Bulgaria 52.23 57.28 64.21 70.65 72.30 50.61 53.03 58.69 63.97 65.06 65.96 63.96
Croatia 45.47 45.43 46.40 46.27 46.52 38.24 38.16 40.87 41.10 42.57 44.42 46.33
Macedonia, FYR 50.17 51.03 54.76 61.98 68.35 54.37 58.09 66.07 66.84 61.46 64.88 65.03
Czech Republic 56.53 59.83 62.45 63.96 61.06 54.81 62.94 67.48 71.37 71.11 76.18 75.05








while other four belong to the group of soft peggers (as presented in particular in 
Table 1).  
 
The 2017  IMF’s classification has been used as a criterion for creating a sample 
which is compared with regimes used in pre-crisis2004 in terms of exchange rate 
regime and monetary policy framework, although both the classification scheme 
and the status of a particular country varied over time. The data presented included 
changes in main economic indicators (GDP growth rate, inflation and exports and 
imports of goods and service (both in % of GDP)), covering the 2004-2015 period 
in these selected European economies.   
 
This topic is interesting on few levels. Apart from the on-going discussion on the 
optimality of exchange rate regime choice and exchange rate classification, 
observed countries are participating in different stages of European integration 
processes and exchange rate policy might contribute to the success of the process. 
On the other hand, global crisis as an external shock endangered the economic and 
exchange rate stability and questioned the optimality of chosen regime, potentially 
leading to change of policies, goals and exchange rate strategies.  
 
The change of a regime when a crisis shock occurs would be a risky strategy that 
might further deepen it. Although the exit strategy for European countries includes 
stronger involvement in European integration process (full membership in the 
monetary union as a final stage) the countries either did not fulfill the formal and/or 
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